DURING THE BLACKOUT-INSPIRED LOOTING, THERE WERE 2 CIVILIAN FATALITIES, NO POLICE FATALITIES, AND 3,800 ARRESTS. THE RELATIVE RESTRAINT SHOWN BY THE POLICE WAS NOT AN ACCIDENT OF HISTORY. THE NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT (NYPD) APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CONSISTENTLY ON TOP OF THE GHETTO-POLICING AND FIREARMS-USE ISSUES. IN EARLY 1972, THE DEPARTMENT ESTABLISHED A FIREARMS DISCHARGE REVIEW BOARD, WHICH DEVELOPED DEPARTMENTAL POLICY CONCERNING THE USE OF FIREARMS IN ALL SITUATIONS. TRAINING IN CROWD CONTROL AND HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION WAS EMPHASIZED, AND ALL OFFICERS WERE REQUIRED TO TAKE PART IN MARKSMANSHIP AND TACTICAL FIREARMS SCHOOLING (WHEN TO SHOOT AND NOT TO SHOOT, AS WELL AS HOW TO SHOOT). IN EFFECT, THE DEPARTMENT EVOLVED A POSITION ON USE OF FIREARMS THAT PUT TOUGHER RESTRICTIONS ON OFFICERS THAN DID THE STATE PENAL LAW. FOR EXAMPLE, THE LAW PERMITS AN OFFICER TO FIRE AT A FLEEING VEHICLE WHOSE DRIVER IS RESISTING ARREST; NYPD RULES ALLOW THE OFFICER TO FIRE AT A FLEEING VEHICLE ONLY IF SHOTS HAVE BEEN FIRED AT THE OFFICER. THE DEPARTMENT APPEARS TO BE SERIOUS ABOUT ENFORCING ITS OWN RESTRICTIONS. SINCE 1972, THERE HAS BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL DECREASE IN THE NUMBER OF FIREARM DISCHARGE INCIDENTS AND IN THE NUMBER OF PERPETRATORS KILLED BY OFFICERS. ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE NYPD'S RESTRAINED APPROACH TO THE BLACKOUT LOOTING SITUATION ARE PRESENTED. IT IS POINTED OUT THAT, IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, A POLICE DEPARTMENT SHOULD BE DESIGNED NEITHER TO EXTINGUISH NOR TO IGNITE, BUT TO MAINTAIN ORDER AND TO CONTAIN DISORDER. (AUTHOR ABSTRACT MODIFIED--LKM)