IT IS NOTED THAT THE RATIONALE BY WHICH THE WHITESEL COURT REACHED ITS CONCLUSION MAY HAVE AN INTERESTING EFFECT ON COURT RULES AFFECTING LAY REPRESENTATION. BECAUSE THE SIXTH CIRCUIT COURT, IN THE WHITESEL CASE, HELD THAT THE SIXTH AMENDMENT DOES NOT PROHIBIT LAY REPRESENTATION (ALTHOUGH IT DOES NOT GUARANTEE IT), IT IS BELIEVED THAT ANY COURT RULE ABSOLUTELY FORBIDDING LAY REPRESENTATION WOULD BE SUBJECT TO CHALLENGE. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS, WHILE RESORTING TO RULES OF THE DISTRICT COURT TO FIND A PROVISION FOR JUDICIAL DISCRETION, ALSO SUPPORTS A CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT THAT THE JUDGE BE ALLOWED TO EXERCISE HIS DISCRETION IN FAVOR OF LAY REPRESENTATION. IT IS BELIEVED THAT A DEFENDANT'S NORMAL INTEREST IN HAVING THE BEST REPRESENTATION POSSIBLE, IN ADDITION TO THE COURT'S ADVICE ABOUT OBTAINING QUALIFIED COUNSEL, WILL TEND TO REDUCE THE CHANCE OF ANY WHOLESALE USE OF LAY REPRESENTATION. IT IS CONSIDERED LIKELY THAT COURTS WILL RECOGNIZE THE FUTILITY OF DENYING LAY REPRESENTATION IN SITUATIONS WHERE A DEFENDANT ABSOLUTELY REFUSES A LICENSED COUNSEL. THE RESULT IS PREDICTED TO BE A VERY LIMITED RECOGNITION OF THE CONCEPT OF LAY REPRESENTATION. (RCB)