TERRORISM IS MUCH MORE THAN A CRIMINAL ACT AND MAY REQUIRE MORE THAN THE CUSTOMARY POLICE RESPONSE. THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF POLITICAL GOALS THROUGH THE USE OF WEAPONS IS CONSIDERED THE ESSENTIAL TACTIC OF TERRORISM, EVEN THOUGH THE SCALE OF SUCH ACTIVITY FALLS SHORT OF CONVENTIONAL WARFARE. THE USES OF TERRORISM ARE IDENTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: (1) A SUBSTITUTE FOR REGULAR WARFARE, WHICH WOULD PROBABLY BRING DEFEAT, AS IN THE CASE OF THE PALESTINIANS AGAINST THE ISRAELIS; (2) IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER MILITARY ACTIVITIES, AS IN THE CASES OF CUBA (AGAINST BATISTA) AND VIETNAM (AGAINST THE SAIGON ADMINISTRATIONS); AND (3) IN THE CONFLICT OF ONE SEGMENT OF A NATION'S POPULATION AGAINST ANOTHER SEGMENT OR A FOREIGN POWER, AS IN NORTHERN IRELAND. WHILE TERRORISM IS THOUGHT TO BE MILITARILY EFFECTIVE AGAINST AN OCCUPYING FOREIGN POWER, IT IS GENERALLY INEFFECTIVE WHEN EMPLOYED AGAINST AN INDIGENOUS GOVERNMENT, UNLESS ACCOMPANIED BY CONVENTIONAL WARFARE. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE, MATERIAL DESTRUCTION, AND ECONOMIC DAMAGE ARE IDENTIFIED AS THE FUNDAMENTAL FUNCTIONS OF TERRORISM AS A MILITARY WEAPON. LABELING TERRORISM AS A MILITARY TACTIC RATHER THAN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY RAISES THE QUESTIONS AS TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH A MILITARY, NOT JUST A POLICE RESPONSE IS APPROPRIATE. THE LEVEL OF INTENSITY OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY IS CONSIDERED MORE IMPORTANT THAN ANY OTHER FACTOR IN DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATENESS OF A MILITARY RESPONSE. A MILITARY RESPONSE WOULD BE APPROPRIATE IF TERRORISTS SEIZED A MAJOR BUILDING OR BUILDINGS OR WERE HOLDING A NUCLEAR WEAPON OR MAJOR BACTERIAL WEAPON. THE U.S. MILITARY SHOULD GIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH A MILITARY RESPONSE TO TERRORISM IS REQUIRED AND THE STRATEGIES APPROPRIATE FOR VARIOUS CIRCUMSTANCES. NOTES AND REFERENCES ARE PROVIDED. (RCB)