TERRORISM'S THREAT TO GLOBAL POLITICAL STABILITY COMPELS AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE, SCOPE, AND MAGNITUDE OF THIS TRANSNATIONAL FORCE. LIBYA, AS A PRIMARY HOST COUNTRY, IS A USEFUL SITE FOR SUCH ANALYSIS AND FOR THE APPLICATION OF COUNTERSTRATEGIES TO PRESSURE SUCH A HOST COUNTRY INTO WITHDRAWING ITS SUPPORT OR TACIT APPROVAL OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES. TERRORISM IS PERCEIVED BOTH AS A MEANS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN WHICH TARGETS ARE SELECTED FOR THEIR POLITICAL VALUE AND THEIR EFFECT UPON PUBLIC MORALE, AND AS A MEANS OF SURROGATE WARFARE BY WHICH A HOST NATION MAY OBTAIN MILITARY OBJECTIVES WITHOUT THE CONSPICUOUS USE OF THE HOST COUNTRY'S FORCES. BOTH THEORIES OF THE USE OF TERRORISM ARE DEMONSTRATED IN THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. THE USE OF TERRORISTS TO FURTHER THE POLITICAL GOALS OF LIBYA AND OF ITS LEADER QADHDAFI IS RATIONALIZED AS BEING A RELATIVELY INEXPENSIVE METHOD OF MAINTAINING PRESSURE UPON ISRAEL, AND OF SOLIDIFYING LIBYA'S POSITION WITHIN THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION. PHILOSOPHIES CONCERNING COUNTERTERRORISM AND NEGOTIATION ARE DIVERSE, RANGING FROM CONCEPTS AND ACTIONS OF NONCAPITULATION TO THE YIELDING TO DEMANDS. NO APPROACH IS SEEN TO HAVE BEEN ENTIRELY SUCCESSFUL. ACTIVITIES OF NATIONS ACTING INDIVIDUALLY AND IN GROUPS ARE EXAMINED, INCLUDING THE USE OF SPECIAL POLICE AND MILITARY FORCES TO COUNTER TERRORISTS. AVAILABLE OPTIONS BY WHICH HOST COUNTRIES MAY BE CONVINCED TO END THEIR SUPPORT OF TERRORISTS INCLUDE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS SUCH AS BOYCOTTS OF LIBYAN OIL AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS. COOPERATION WITH INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION PROCEDURES ALSO MIGHT BE COMPELLED THROUGH THE REDUCTION OR ELIMINATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN HOST COUNTRIES. ALTHOUGH AN ARMS BOYCOTT IS SEEN TO BE FUTILE IN THE AREA OF SMALL ARMS, SUCH AN ACTION COULD PREVENT THE DISTRIBUTION OF MORE SOPHISTOCATED WEAPONS. FOOTNOTES ARE PROVIDED. (TWK).