A LAW CODE IS DEFINED AS 'A PRE-EMPTIVE, SYSTEMATIC, AND COMPREHENSIVE ENACTMENT OF A WHOLE FIELD OF LAW.' THE CODIFICATION MOVEMENT IN CRIMINAL LAW IS TO BE WELCOMED, BECAUSE WITH IT, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF CRIMES HAS BENEFITED THROUGH MORE PRECISE DEFINITIONS NOT ONLY OF THE RULES DEFINING OFFENSES THEMSELVES, BUT ALSO OF THE DOCTRINES AND PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. IT HAS ALSO PERMITTED THE DISCARDING OF SOME OF THE MORE IRRATIONAL CONCEPTS WHICH HAVE ENCUMBERED CRIMINAL LAW. THERE ARE THREE HAZARDS, HOWEVER, THAT CAN ACCOMPANY JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF CODIFIED LAW--RETENTION OF PRECODE VOCABULARY AND CONCEPTS IN RENDERING JUDICIAL DECISIONS, READING A CODE ONLY AS A GROUP OF STATUTES RATHER THAN AS A UNIFIED SYSTEM OF LAW, AND USING DRAFTERS' COMMENTS AS AUTHORITATIVE IN INTERPRETING THE LEGISLATIVE MEANING OF THE CODE ITSELF. THESE HAZARDS ARE IN EVIDENCE IN THE ILLINOIS CASE OF PEOPLE VERSUS WHITE, WHICH INVOLVES AN INTERPRETATION OF THE ILLINOIS CRIMINAL CODE PROSCRIPTION OF ARMED ROBBERY. THE ACCUSED'S ONLY DEFENSE, INTOXICATION AT THE TIME OF THE ROBBERY, WAS REJECTED BY THE TRIAL COURT; HIS CONVICTION WAS AFFIRMED BY THE APPELLATE COURT. THE DECISION OF THE APPELLATE COURT AND THE ARGUMENT OF THE STATE BEFORE THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT CAN BE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS: (1) ROBBERY IS A GENERAL INTENT CRIME, (2) THE INTOXICATION DEFENSE IS AVAILABLE ONLY FOR SPECIFIC INTENT CRIMES, AND (3) THEREFORE, THE INTOXICATION DEFENSE IS NOT AVAILABLE IN A ROBBERY PROSECUTION. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER ROBBERY IS A 'GENERAL' OR 'SPECIFIC' INTENT CRIME IS NOT DEALT WITH IN THE CODE ITSELF; THE TERMS ARE CARRIED OVER FROM PRECODE TIMES. THIS INTRODUCES A CONFUSION OF INTERPRETATION THAT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED HAD THE CODE DRAFTERS SUPPLIED A TERM OF ART TO DESCRIBE THE GENERAL MENS REQUIREMENT. FURTHER, IN INTERPRETING THE CASE, THE CODE SECTION ON ARMED ROBBERY IS TREATED AS A SEPARATE LEGISLATIVE ITEM IN THE CODE, WHEN IT SHOULD BE VIEWED FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF AUTHORITATIVE GENERAL PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN OTHER SECTIONS OF THE CODE. THIS TENDENCY COULD HAVE BEEN ALLEVIATED HAD THE DRAFTERS USED CROSS REFERENCES WITHIN THE CODE. ALSO, IN COURT DECISIONS IN THIS CASE, THE LANGUAGE OF THE DRAFTERS OF THE CODE WAS USED AS AUTHORITATIVE INTERPRETATION OF THE MEANING OF THE LAW. THIS COULD BE AVOIDED IF THE DRAFTERS USED MINIMAL INTERPRETATION OF THEIR INTENT WHILE LETTING THE CODE SPEAK FOR ITSELF. (RCB)