PROSECUTORS, WHOSE SUCCESS IS MEASURED STATISTICALLY IN NUMBERS OF CONVICTIONS, ARE DEPENDENT ON PLEA BARGAINING FOR THEIR EMPLOYMENT AND ADVANCEMENT. WORKING UNDER TIME PRESSURES AND HEAVY CASELOADS, PROSECUTORS OFTEN OVERCHARGE TO MAKE CERTAIN A GUILTY PLEA WILL BE OBTAINED. PLEA BARGAINING IS PARTICULARLY ATTRACTIVE TO INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, WHO WOULD BE AT A DISADVANTAGE AT TRIAL, AND TO DEFENDANTS FACING A STRONG PROBABILITY OF CONVICTION. SOME DEFENDANTS USE PLEA BARGAINING AS A MEANS OF GETTING OUT OF JAIL. REPEAT OFFENDERS FAMILIAR WITH THE SYSTEM CAN USE PLEA BARGAINING TO GAIN MORE LENIENT TREATMENT, WHEREAS FIRST-TIME OFFENDERS MIGHT RECEIVE HARSHER SENTENCES. IN A PLEA-BARGAINING CONTEXT, IT IS NOT DEFENSE COUNSEL'S ADVOCACY SKILLS THAT DETERMINE THEIR ABILITY TO NEGOTIATE EQUITABLE COMPROMISES, BUT RATHER THE DEGREE OF AFFINITY BETWEEN COUNSEL AND THE PROSECUTION. JUDGES' MAJOR INTEREST IN PLEA BARGAINING IS THE REDUCTION OF CROWDED CRIMINAL DOCKETS. FACTORS SUCH AS TIME PRESSURES AND BASIC ORIENTATION TOWARD THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE JUDICIARY DETERMINE WHETHER A JUDGE PERFORMS A PASSIVE OR DOMINANT ROLE IN THE PLEA-BARGAINING PROCESS. BOTH APPROACHES HAVE THEIR ADVANTAGES AND DRAWBACKS, AND THERE APPEARS TO BE NO CLEAR TREND TOWARD EITHER APPROACH. THE PUBLIC INTEREST IS CONTRAVENED BY PLEA BARGAINING, BECAUSE THE PRACTICE ENCOURAGES INFRINGEMENT OF ESTABLISHED CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES. DETERMINATIONS OF GUILT AND SENTENCING ARE LEFT TO PROSECUTORS AND DEFENDANTS WHO ARE EFFECTIVELY OUTSIDE OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. SOCIETY IS THE BIGGEST LOSER IN PLEA BARGAINING, ESPECIALLY WHEN DEFENDANTS ARE SENTENCED FOR CRIMES THAT BEAR LITTLE, IF ANY, RELATIONSHIP TO THE CONDUCT OF WHICH THEY ARE CULPABLE. PLEA BARGAINING IS A JUDICIAL SYSTEM-CREATED CANCER FOR WHICH NO CURE IS KNOWN. (LKM)