THE CONCEPTS OF LAW, LEGAL PROCESS, AND SOCIAL SCIENCE ARE CONSIDERED, AND THE RELATIONSHIP OF LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS TO THE SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY IS DISCUSSED. THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING OF THE LEGAL PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES (THE ORGANIZATION AND JURISDICTIONS OF STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS) IS DESCRIBED, AND THE BEHAVIOR OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE PROCESS (JUDGES AND LAWYERS) AS THEY MAKE PUBLIC POLICY AND ALLOCATE JUSTICE IN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IS EXAMINED. THE DISCUSSION CLOSES WITH AN ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL PROCESS AS A TOOL FOR SOLVING POLICY PROBLEMS. THE GENERAL THESIS ADVANCED IS THAT JURISPRUDENCE WAS THE FIRST OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND, AS A PRECURSORY DISCIPLINE, PROVIDED THE NEWLY EMERGING SOCIAL SCIENCES WITH DATA, METHODS, AND TOOLS. ONLY IN THE 1960'S AND 1970'S DID THE SOCIAL SCIENCES BEGIN TO REPAY THEIR INTELLECTUAL DEBT TO JURISPRUDENCE. THE EMERGING 'JURISCIENCE' OF THIS PERIOD SUGGESTS SEVERAL GENERALIZATIONS ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE: (1) IN STUDYING LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, A DISTINCTION MUST BE MADE BETWEEN BEHAVIORAL AND ATTITUDINAL CHANGE; (2) JUDICIAL DECISIONS CAN PRODUCE ATTITUDINAL CHANGES INCONSISTENT WITH POLICY OBJECTIVES, ALTHOUGH SOME JUDICIAL DECISIONS APPEAR TO HAVE HAD A DIRECT, POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON EVEN DEEPLY ROOTED ATTITUDES; (3) LAW RECIPIENTS (THOSE WHO BENEFIT FROM JUDICIAL DECISIONS RATHER THAN MAKING OR APPLYING THEM) MAY HAVE A COGNITIVE UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR RIGHTS UNDER A DECISION BUT OFTEN HAVE NEITHER AN APPRECIATION OF THOSE RIGHTS NOR THE ABILITY TO USE THEM; AND (4) THERE ARE ADVANTAGES AND LIMITATIONS TO USING COURTS TO SOLVE POLICY PROBLEMS, BUT THE JUDICIARY PROBABLY IS NOT SO MUCH AN INSTRUMENT FOR CHANGE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF ACCOMODATION BETWEEN CHANGE AND STABILITY. AN INDEX IS PROVIDED. (LKM)