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INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS TO THE N-PRISONERS' DILEMMA

NCJ Number
56294
Journal
American Political Science Review Volume: 72 Issue: 2 Dated: (1978) Pages: 411-421
Author(s)
J M ORBELL; L A WILSON
Date Published
1978
Length
11 pages
Annotation
THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MAJORITARIAN DEMOCRACY, A 'SELFISH DICTATORSHIP,' AND UNCOORDINATED INDIVIDUALISM ARE EXPLORED UNDER VARIOUS CONDITIONS USING A SIMPLE NINE-PERSON GAME.
Abstract
THE PRISONERS' DILEMMA REFERS TO THE PARABLE OF TWO WHO HAVE BEEN CAPTURED AND CHARGED WITH THE SAME CRIME. FOR EACH PRISONER, UNDER THE STRUCTURE OF THE GAME, THE DILEMMA LIES IN THE CONFLICT BETWEEN WHAT IS RATIONAL ACTION FOR ONESELF AS A MEMBER OF A TWO-PERSON COLLECTIVE. BY ATTENDING TO THEIR INDIVIDUAL PAYOFFS, PRISONERS WILL BE LED TO AN OUTCOME THAT IS AT BEST SUBOPTIMAL FOR THEMSELVES AND AT WORST A 'COLLECTIVE DISASTER' (FOR THE CLASSIC STATEMENT OF THE DILEMMA, SEE R. DUNCAN AND HOWARD RAIFFA, 1957). THE EXISTENCE OF N-PRISONERS' DILEMMAS (CONFLICT BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RATIONALITY) IS A STANDARD JUSTIFICATION FOR COLLECTIVIZING DECISIONMAKING THROUGH THE STATE, BUT THERE IS LITTLE THEORY ABOUT HOW DIFFERENT INSTITUTIONS OPERATE TO 'SOLVE' SUCH DILEMMAS. TO EXAMINE THREE SUCH INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS--MAJORITARIAN DEMOCRACY, 'SELFISH DICATORSHIP,' AND UNCOORDINATED INDIVIDUALISM--A GAME CONSISTING OF NINE PLAYERS IS CONSTRUCTED, WITH EACH HAVING THE CHOICE BETWEEN DEFECTING AND COOPERATING AND, AS REQUIRED BY THE PRISONERS' DILEMMA, THE REWARD FOR DEFECTING IS GREATER THAN THE REWARD FOR COOPERATING. DEFECTING, HOWEVER, INVOLVES A 'SOCIAL FINE' THAT MUST BE PAID IN EQUAL SHARES BY ALL PLAYERS. THE EXISTENCE OF THIS FINE MEANS THAT INDIVIDUAL PAYOFFS FOR BOTH COOPERATING AND DEFECTING WILL DECLINE AS THE NUMBER OF DEFECTING INDIVIDUALS INCREASES. RESULTS SHOW THAT WHEN THE OPPORTUNITY COSTS OF COOPERATION ARE LESS THAN HALF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE SOCIAL FINE, MAJORITARIAN DEMOCRCY IS CLEARLY THE MOST EFFECTIVE MECHANISM FOR INSURING THAT A SOCIETY ACHIEVES THE LARGEST POSSILBE SOCIAL PRODUCT. WHEN THE OPPORTUNITY COSTS OF COOPERATION ARE MORE THAN HALF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE SOCIAL FINE BUT LESS THAN THE TOTAL MAGNITUDE OF THAT FINE, MAJORITARIAN DEMOCRACY HAS NO EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTION, AND ANY OUTCOME IS POSSIBLE. ALSO, WHEN THE OPPORTUNITY COSTS OF COOPERATION ARE GREATER THAN THE MAGNITUDE OF THE SOCIAL FINE, ANYTHING IS POSSIBLE UNDER MAJORITY RULE. THUS, INFORMATION ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE CONFIGURATION FACING A SOCIETY IS CRITICAL TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM. GRAPHIC DATA AND REFERENCES ARE PROVIDED. (RCB)

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