BEGINNING WITH A LOOK AT THE PRACTICAL TRADEOFFS THAT PRESIDENTS FACE IN MAJOR POLICY ARENAS, THE INITIAL SECTON SUGGESTS THAT THE PRESIDENT'S DOMESTIC ROLE IS, IN GENERAL, SUBSTANTIALLY CONSTRAINED BY THE HIGHER VALUES PLACED ON FOREIGN POLICY, THE COMPLEXITY AND COMPELLING NATURE OF DOMESTIC ISSUES, AND THE INABILITY TO BE INNOVATIVE. BRIEF SUMMARIES OF THE DOMESTIC POLICIES OF PRESIDENTS KENNEDY, JOHNSON, AND NIXON HIGHLIGHT THE INTERACTION BETWEEN STRUCTURAL OR SYSTEMIC HANDICAPS--THE FLUCTUATION OF PUBLIC SENTIMENT, THE SIZE AND COMPLEXITY OF THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY, THE STATUS OF THE PREDECESSOR'S APPROACH, THE ABILITY OF CONGESS TO CENSOR POLICY--AND THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY. THEN HISTORICAL INCIDENTS IN WHICH PRESIDENTS DIRECTLY APPLIED THEIR POWERS TO DIVISIVE SOCIAL EVENTS ARE EXAMINED IN RELATION TO ORDINARY CRIME. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT, WHILE PRESIDENTS HAVE SUBSTANTIAL POWER IN NATIONAL EMERGENCIES, THEY HAVE LITTLE IN THE AREA OF ORDINARY CRIME. NEXT, THE PAPER CHALLENGES THE PRESIDENT'S PRACTICAL ABILITY TO COMPREHEND THE VAST DIMENSIONS OF THE ORDINARY CRIME PROBLEM BY CRITICIZING BROAD CONCEPTIONS ABOUT CRIME, DISCUSSING PERFORMANCE PROBLEMS OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, AND POINTING OUT THE SHORTCOMINGS OF INFORMATION SOURCES SUCH AS UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS AND SPECIAL CRIME COMMISSION REPORTS. CASE STUDIES OF IDEOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS REGARDING THE POLICIES OF KENNEDY, JOHNSON, AND NIXON ARE PRESENTED, AND A CONCLUDING STATEMENT MAINTAINS THAT PRESIDENTS ARE ACTUALLY THE MOST INEFFECTIVE POLICYMAKERS IN THE ANTICRIME PROCESS DUE TO THEIR MULTIPLE LIMITATIONS. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT CRIME BE CONSIDERED A NATIONAL RATHER THAN JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEM, PRESIDENTS DESIST FROM POLICYMAKING IN THIS AREA, AND THAT CRIME AND CRIME CONTROL MEASURES BE RETURNED TO A KIND OF 'MARKET PRINCIPLE' SO THAT LOCAL POLICYMAKERS COULD FIND WAYS TO BALANCE THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND. REFERENCES ARE PROVIDED. (DAG)