THE MODEL OF POLICE DEMAND ASSUMES THAT CITIZENS IN THE COMMUNITY HAVE PREFERENCES FOR THE QUANTITY OF POLICE PROTECTION PROVIDED AND THAT DECISIONMAKERS FOLLOW THESE PREFERENCES AS THEY ALLOCATE FUNDS TO THE POLICE DEPARTMENT. A SIMPLE PUBLIC CHOICE FRAMEWORK IS FOLLOWED IN EQUATION DEVELOPMENT BY POSTULATING A CITIZEN UTILITY FUNCTION, WHERE CITIZENS CHOOSE BETWEEN PRIVATE GOODS AND POLICE PROTECTION, AND AN INCOME CONSTRAINT (EXOGENOUS REAL INCOME, ENDOWMENT INCOME, AND PROPERTY VALUE) IN ORDER TO DETERMINE UTILITY MAXIMIZATION CONDITIONS. THE DEMAND MODEL IS BASED ON AN EVAULATION OF THE MARGINAL PRODUCTIVITY OF POLICE BY CITIZENS AND REPRESENTS A CERTAIN DESIRED QUANTITY OF PATROLMEN AT A GIVEN WAGE LEVEL. IT INDICATES THAT POLICE SERVICES ARE COMPETITIVE WITH ALL GOVERNMENT SERVICES AND RECOGNIZES SUCH DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES AS TRAFFIC CONGESTION, CRIME RATE, AND OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE COMMUNITY. IN THE CALIFORNIA SAMPLE, 147 CITIES WITH A POPULATION BETWEEN 20,000 AND 100,000 IN 1960 WERE INCLUDED. THE 2 YEARS OF THE SAMPLE WERE 1960 AND 1970. EMPIRICAL RESULTS SHOWED THAT THE WAGE RATE FOR NEW PATROLMEN WAS NEGATIVELY RELATED TO THE DEMAND FOR THEM. PROPERTY VALUE WAS POSITIVELY RELATED TO THE NUMBER OF PER CAPITA POLICE, AND TOTAL PER CAPITA CRIME WAS POSITIVELY RELATED TO THE NUMBER OF POLICE HIRED. THE MEDIAN INCOME OF CITIZENS DID NOT APPEAR TO BE AN IMPORTANT VARIABLE IN THE DEMAND FOR POLICE. IT WAS OBSERVED THAT PHYSICAL NEEDS MAY PLAY AN IMPORTANT PART IN THE DEMAND FOR POLICE SERVICES. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL IN CALIFORNIA SHOWS THAT THE DEMAND FOR POLICE PROTECTION IS VERY WAGE-INELASTIC AND THAT POLICE OFFICERS CAN FEEL RELATIVELY SECURE THEY WILL NOT BE RELEASED IF THEIR PAY INCREASES. SUPPORTING DATA AND EQUATIONS, NOTES, AND REFERENCES ARE INCLUDED. (DEP)