JAMES M. BUCHANAN, IN HIS PAPER, 'A DEFENSE OF ORGANIZED CRIME?' ARGUES THAT MONOPOLY IN CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES PRODUCES A DESIRED REDUCTION IN THE VOLUME OF CRIME DUE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIES OF SCALE. MONOPOLIZATION TENDS TOWARD A REDUCTION IN THE OUTPUT OF A GIVEN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY, WHILE THE MARKET PRICE OF THE SERVICES OR PRODUCTS OF THAT CRIMINAL ACTIVITY INCREASES, THUS REDUCING THE NUMBER OF BUYERS WHO CAN AFFORD PARTICIPATION IN THE CRIMINAL ACTIVITY. GIVEN THE INABILITY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT TO ERADICATE CRIME, THE MOST RATIONAL AND PRACTICAL POLICY FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT IS PASSIVE ACQUIESCENCE TOWARD INCREASED MONOPOLIZED SYNDICATION OF CRIME, LEADING TO A CONTAINMENT OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY, ARGUES BUCHANAN. THIS THEORY FAILS TO CONSIDER THE CONSQUENCES OF THE HUGE PROFIT ENJOYED BY CRIME MONOPOLIES. CRIME MONOPOLIES IN A GIVEN JURISDICTION CAN USE THEIR PROFITS TO DIVERSIFY ILLICIT ACTIVITY AND EVEN INJECT UNFAIR COMPETITION INTO THE LEGITIMATE ECONOMIC MARKET BY FINANCING LEGITIMATE ECONOMIC MARKET BY FINANCING LEGITIMATE BUSINESSES WITHOUT THE USUAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH CAPITAL FINANCING. THEREFORE, A PRODUCTIVE LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY SHOULD AIM AT SQUEEZING THE PROFITS THAT WOULD BE ENJOYED BY CRIME MONOPOLIES IF THEY ARE ALLOWED TO OPERATE WITHOUT HINDRANCE. ONE WAY OF INCREASING THE COSTS OF MONOPOLISTIC CRIME DIVERSIFICATION WOULD BE TO MAKE SENTENCING SEVERITY GEOMETRICALLY (INSTEAD OF ARITHMETICALLY) CUMULATIVE AS AN ORGANIZED CRIME FIGURE IS CONVICTED OF EACH CRIME IS A SERIES. REGULAR LAW ENFORCEMENT HARASSMENT OF CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES WOULD ALSO INCREASE THE COST OF OPERATION. THIS LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY WOULD PERMIT THE MONOPOLIZATION AND CONSEQUENT REDUCTION OF THE VOLUME OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY WHILE DIMINISHING PROFITS THAT COULD LEAD TO FURTHER DIVERSIFICATION AND EXPANSION OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY. FOOTNOTES ARE PROVIDED. (RCB)