BY 1980, ENOUGH NUCLEAR MATERIAL SUITABLE FOR WEAPONS USE WILL BE PRODUCED ANNUALLY TO MAKE AT LEAST 4,000 FISSION BOMBS. BY THE YEAR 2000, THIS NUMBER WILL RISE TO 250,000. A GROUP OF REVOLUTIONARIES COULD STEAL THESE MATERIALS, MAKE A BOMB, AND USHER IN AN ATOMIC AGE OF TERRORISM. THE ONLY BOMB COMPONENTS HARD TO GET ARE NUCLEAR ELEMENTS THEMSELVES WHICH HAVE TO BE DIVERTED OR STOLEN FROM SITES OWNED BY THE ATOMIC INDUSTRY. OF MATERIALS IN USE OR PLANNED FOR USE IN NUCLEAR REACTORS, ONLY PLUTONIMUM-239, ENRICHED URANIUM-235, AND URANIUM-233 ARE USEFUL IN BOMB CONSTRUCTION. PLUTONIUM IS THE MOST LIKELY CANDIDATE FOR THEFT. THE INCREASED AVAILABILITY OF PLUTONIUM RESULTING FROM THE ANTICIPATED INCREASE IN NUCLEAR REACTORS MAKES PLUTONIUM A TARGET FOR THEFT BECAUSE ITS VALUE PER KILOGRAM IS ESTIMATED AT $10,000, MAKING IT AN ATTRACTIVE BLACK MARKET COMMODITY; AND RELATIVELY SMALL AMOUNTS OF PLUTONIUM ARE NEEDED TO MAKE A BOMB. BESIDES ITS POTENTIAL AS A BOMB MATERIAL, PLUTONIUM IS EXTREMELY POISONOUS. ON A SCALE OF LETHAL DOSES, IT IS AT LEAST 20,000 TIMES MORE TOXIC THAN COBRA VENOM OR POTASSIUM CYANIDE AND 1,000 TIMES MORE TOXIC THAN NERVE GAS. THE MOST CRITICAL PHASES OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL PROCESSING WITH REGARD TO NUCLEAR THEFT INCLUDE REPROCESSING AND FABRICATION OF FUEL FROM BURNT-OUT FUEL ASSEMBLIES. THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION REQUIRES CERTAIN SECURITY PRECAUTIONS IN THE USE OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS, BUT FLAWS EXIST IN SECURITY. PROTECTION FOR THE WEAKEST LINK IN THE FUEL CYCLE, TRANSPORTATION BETWEEN REPROCESSING AND FUEL FABRICATION PLANTS, IS MINIMAL. THERE IS MORE EMPHASIS ON DETECTING THEFT THAN ON PREVENTING THEFT. FOUR AREAS REQUIRING IMMEDIATE ATTENTION ARE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPECIFIC MEASURES FOR MORE UNIFORM AND COMPLETE PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AT PLANTS AND IN TRANSIT, SECURITY REVIEW, AND WORLD SECURITY TO MINIMIZE THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR THEFT AND TERRORISM ON A GLOBAL SCALE. (DEP)