THE NUNN BILL IS BASED ON THE CONCEPT OF STATE DISCIPLINARY COMMISSIONS AND IS ENDORSED IN PRINCIPLE BY THE AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY. OTHER SUPPORTERS INCLUDE THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, AND CERTAIN SUPREME COURT JUSTICES. OPPONENTS OF THE BILL FOLLOW THE TRADITION THAT JUDGES CAN BE REMOVED ONLY BY IMPEACHMENT. CONTROVERSY OVER THE BILL INDICATES THAT JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSIONS REPRESENT TOO SIGNIFICANT A CHANGE TO ACCOMPLISH THROUGH LEGISLATION ALONE. SEVERAL CONSIDERATIONS SEEM TO CAST DOUBT ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE BILL: (1) ONLY THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT SPECIFICALLY HAS THE POWER TO REMOVE ONE OF ITS OWN MEMBERS; (2) THE PRESIDENT CAN REMOVE A FEDERAL OFFICIAL WHO EXERCISES QUASIJUDICIAL POWER BUT ONLY FOR REASONS PERMITTED BY CONGRESS; (3) CONGRESS CANNOT PUNISH FEDERAL JUDGES BY LOWERING THEIR SALARIES IN A DISCRIMINATORY WAY; AND (4) BY ANALOGY WITH THE 25TH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION, NO BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT SHOULD DETERMINE THE FITNESS OF ITS OWN MEMBERS. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE NUNN BILL MAY LOWER RATHER THAN RAISE THE LEVEL OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY AND MAY PRODUCE A JUDICIARY COMPRISED OF MERE CONFORMISTS. FURTHER, THE BILL'S COUNCIL ON TENURE MAY ABUSE ITS REMOVAL POWER AND CONTEMPORARY ENGLISH PRACTICES ARGUE AGAINST THE BILL. CASE LAW IS CITED. (DEP)