THE JEFFERS CASE CONCERNED A WAIVER OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY RIGHTS BY A DEFENDANT WHO HAD BEEN CHARGED UNDER TWO SECTIONS OF THE DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONTROL ACT OF 1970 AND HAD BEEN CONVICTED ON BOTH CHARGES AT SEPARATE TRIALS. THE COURT CONCLUDED THAT ONE STATUTE WAS A LESSER OFFENSE INCLUDED UNDER THE LARGER OFFENSE. HOWEVER, THE COURT ALSO DETERMINED THAT A PLEA OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY WAS UNAVAILING BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT HAD REQUESTED THE SEPARATE TRIALS THEREBY WAIVING HIS DOUBLE JEOPARDY RIGHTS. MOST CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS CAN BE WAIVED BY EXPRESS CONSENT, BY FAILURE TO ASSERT THE RIGHT, OR BY ACTS INCONSISTENT WITH NONWAIVER. WHETHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, A WAIVER MUST BE INTENTIONAL. SUCH A STANDARD INDICATES THAT THERE MUST BE SOME KNOWLEDGE BY A DEFENDANT OF THE PRESENCE OF A PROTECTIVE RIGHT, AS WELL AS A CONSCIOUS, INTENTIONAL DECISION BY THE DEFENDANT TO FOREGO ITS PROTECTION. THIS WAS APPARENTLY NOT THE CASE IN JEFFERS. THE DECISION THUS CALLS INTO QUESTION THE RESPONSIBLILITY OF THE COURTS TO PROTECT CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES AND INDICATES THE NEED FOR A REAPPRAISAL OF THE MEANING OF WAIVER, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS DOUBLE JEOPARDY RIGHTS. FOOTNOTES ARE PROVIDED. (RCB)