GUERRILLAS HAVE PREYED ON CONVENTIONAL ARMIES FOR CENTURIES, BUT ONLY IN THE PAST DECADE HAVE THEY MOVED INTO URBAN AREAS. THEIR EXTRAORDINARY SUCCESS UNDERSCORES THE SERIOUSNESS OF THIS THREAT TO INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES. URBAN GUERRILLAS ARE UNIQUE IN THEIR ABILITY TO EVADE CAPTURE BY NULLIFYING THE ADVANTAGES OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS, THEY FREQUENTLY RELY ON THE FREEDOMS GUARANTEED CITIZENS OF DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES TO SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETE DARING OPERATIONS, CAPITALIZING ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE TARGET GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO RESPOND TO THEIR APPROACH. A CASE STUDY OF THE BAADER-MEINHOF GANG PROVIDES A USEFUL EXAMPLE OF HOW WEST GERMANY DEALT WITH THE URBAN GUERRILLA THREAT. DEVELOPING FROM THE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS OF THE 60'S, THE GANG'S EARLY ACTIVITIES CENTERED ON RECRUITMENT, TRAINING, AND DEVELOPMENT OF A COMMAND AND CONTROL INFRASTRUCTURE. MEMBERS DEVELOPED A PARTICULARLY VALUABLE NEW TECHNIQUE OF RELYING ON EXTRAORDINARY MOBILITY BETWEEN URBAN AREAS THROUGH USE OF HIGH-SPEED AUTOMOBILES. THEIR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES (BANK ROBBERIES, BOMBING, KIDNAPPINGS) WERE DESIGNED TO STIMULATE INTERNAL STRESS IN AN ACTION-REACTION CYCLE WHICH WOULD POLARIZE PUBLIC OPINION AND CREATE A CLIMATE OF SUSPICION. EVENTUALLY, THE ACTIVITY WOULD ERODE CITIZEN'S TRUST IN GOVERNMENT AND PRODUCE A CLIMATE OF COLLAPSE. GOVERNMENT SUCCESS IN COMBATTING THESE TECHNIQUES RESULTED FROM A COMBINATION OF FACTORS: PROPER TRAINING, EQUIPMENT, AND MOTIVATION OF POLICE AND INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES; COMMUNICATION OF THE THREAT TO THE PUBLIC; PRESERVATION OF THE RULE OF LAW WHILE GOING TO THE LIMIT OF WHAT THE RULE OF LAW ALLOWED; AND REFUSAL TO YIELD TO GUERRILLA DEMANDS. OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS, SUCH AS THE RED ARMY FACTION (RAF), ARE DESCRIBED AND NOTES ARE PROVIDED. (AUTHOR ABSTRACT MODIFIED--MHP)