THE PROPOSED POLITICAL MODEL OF SENTENCING SUGGESTS THAT SENTENCING OCCURS WITHIN A POLITICOLEGAL JURISDICTION OR GEOGRAPHIC AREA WHICH CAN BE DESCRIBED BY ITS SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS. THE LAW AND CULTURE OF THE JURISDICTION PROVIDE THE OUTER LIMITS FOR THE JUDGE'S SENTENCE CHOICES. UNLIKE A MECHANISTIC MODEL WHERE LAW DIRECTLY EXPLAINS AND PREDICTS THE DECISION, IN THE POLITICAL MODEL, CRIMINAL LAW ALLOWS THE JUDGE BROAD SCOPE FOR DISCRETION. A MULTIPLICITY OF EXTERNAL INFLUENCES AFFECTING THE JUDGE IN A GIVEN JURISDICTION AND THE JUDGE'S PERSONAL HANDLING OF THESE INFLUENCES AS THEY CONDITION HIS OR HER OWN VALUES, ROLE DEFINITIONS, AND NEEDS AFFECT THE USE OF SENTENCING DISCRETION. CURRENT SENTENCING REFORM EFFORTS AIM AT RESTRICTING JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE FACTORS IN THE POLITICAL MODEL THAT MAY PRODUCE SENTENCING DISPARITY AND INEFFECTIVENESS (FAILURE TO ACCOMPLISH INTENDED GOALS). THERE IS STRONG APPEAL FOR SENTENCING GUIDELINES WHICH WILL BE BASED UPON THE 'SERIOUSNESS' OF AN OFFENSE AND A 'JUST DESERTS' RATIONALE FOR SENTENCING. WHILE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF UNIFORM SENTENCING GUIDELINES ACROSS JURISDICTIONS MODELED BY VARIOUS POLITICAL AND CULTURAL INFLUENCES IS APPEALING IN ITS SIMPLICITY, IT WILL TEND TO BE UNSTABLE IN ITS STRUCTURE FOR THAT VERY REASON. IT DOES NOT DEAL REALISTICALLY WITH THE MULTIPLICITY OF SENTENCING GOALS AND SITUATIONAL FACTORS AFFECTING SENTENCING EVIDENCED IN THE POLITICAL MODEL FOR EXPLAINING SENTENCING BEHAVIOR. A NEW MYTH IN SENTENCING MAY, HOWEVER, LEAD TO SOME SMALL, CONSTRUCTIVE ADJUSTMENTS AND INNOVATIONS THAT WILL BE STEPS TOWARD CONTROLLING AND GUIDING SENTENCES THAT ISSUE FROM THE COMPLEX, INTERACTIVE POLITICAL MODEL OF COURT DECISIONMAKING. NOTES AND REFERENCES ARE PROVIDED. (RCB)