A MAJOR ISSUE NEEDING CONSIDERATION IS WHETHER THE SILENCE OF THE ACCUSED BEFORE AND DURING THE TRIAL CAN BE THE SUBJECT OF ADVERSE COMMENT AT THE TRIAL. AN IMPORTANT SUBSIDIARY ISSUE IS WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE DIFFERENT PROVISION IN THE LAW GOVERNING HOW FAR THE JUDGE, AS OPPOSED TO THE PROSECUTION, CAN COMMENT ON THE ACCUSED'S SILENCE. ANOTHER ISSUE IS WHETHER CHANGE IS NEEDED IN THE PRESENT PRACTICE OF ALLOWING INFERENCES TO BE DRAWN FROM THE ACCUSED'S SILENCE IN THE FACE OF A STATEMENT BY SOMEONE WITH WHOM THE ACCUSED IS ON EQUAL TERMS AND THE DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN THIS PRACTICE AND THAT WHICH APPLIES WHEN A SUSPECT IS BEING QUESTIONED BY AN INVESTIGATOR. UNDER CURRENT COURT RULINGS, A CONFESSION IS NOT ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE UNLESS IT HAS BEEN VOLUNTARILY GIVEN BY THE DEFENDANT. THE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN APPLYING THIS RULE HAVE PRODUCED ARGUMENTS FOR EXCLUDING ALL CONFESSIONS, ADMITTING ALL CONFESSIONS, AND RELAXING OR TIGHTENING THE VOLUNTARINESS RULE. THE CENTRAL ISSUE IN THE MATTER OF THE ACCUSED'S GIVING EVIDENCE IS WHETHER THE PROSECUTION AND THE JUDGE SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO COMMENT ON THE FAILURE OF THE ACCUSED TO GIVE EVIDENCE AND WHETHER THE COURT OR JURY, IN DETERMINING GUILT, SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO DRAW ADVERSE INFERENCES FROM THAT FAILURE TO TESTIFY. FINALLY, THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE SOURCE OF INFORMATION REGARDING THE LOCATION OF EVIDENCE MUST BE CONSIDERED, NOTABLY WHERE THE ACCUSED HAS PROVIDED SUCH INFORMATION. THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THIS INFORMATION THUS RENDERS PRACTICALLY USELESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM A LOCATION NOT LOGICALLY LINKED TO THE ACCUSED. FOOTNOTES ARE PROVIDED. (RCB)