WHETHER A GIVEN INSURGENCY CAN SUCCEED BY CONFINING ITSELF TO LOW-LEVEL ACTIVITY OR BECOME A PROTRACTED INTERNAL CONFLICT MAY DEPEND ON THE RESPONSE OF THE GOVERNMENT. THE TASKS OF THE GOVERNMENT ARE DETAILED WITH EXAMPLES GIVEN FROM ACTUAL INSURGENCIES SUCH AS THOSE IN VIETNAM AND GREECE. THE GOVERNMENT MUST BE PREPARED TO COMBAT FOUR TYPES OF THREAT WITH FOUR KINDS OF RESPONSES: (1) INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROPAGANDA EFFORTS MET WITH COUNTERORGANIZATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE; (2) TERRORISM COUNTERED WITH POLICE, INTELLIGENCE, AND SECURITY MEASURES; (3) GUERRILLA WARFARE COUNTERED BY LOW-LEVEL MILITARY ACTION; AND (4) MOBILE CONVENTIONAL WARFARE COUNTERED BY CONVENTIONAL WARFARE ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT. THE DEMANDS UPON A GOVERNMENT ARE STRESSED, PARTICULARLY THE IMPORTANCE OF ASSESSING THE NEEDS OF THE PEOPLE, AND OF CREATING A SENSE OF LOYALTY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PEOPLE. GUIDELINES ARE OFFERED TO EVALUATE A SITUATION, INCLUDING SERIOUS POPULAR DISSENT THAT SUPPORTS THE INSURGENCY. FOOTNOTES AND A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ARE PROVIDED. (RFC)