TO DETERMINE THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH SAFEGUARDS POLICIES ARE AGREED UPON, AND TO INVESTIGATE THE INTERACTION OF TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF SAFEGUARDS, A RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE WAS ADMINISTERED TO 84 SAFEGUARDS EXPERTS OF 23 NATIONALITIES. THE SURVEY GROUP INCLUDED SCIENTISTS AND EXPERTS FROM COUNTRIES BOTH WITH AND WITHOUT LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMS. THE QUESTIONNAIRE ELICITED RESPONSES CONCERNING FIVE DISTINCT SAFEGUARDS SYSTEMS RANGING FROM A SYSTEM IN WHICH NUCLEAR INDUSTRY COULD DENY INSPECTORS ACCESS TO POWER FACILITIES, TO A SYSTEM IN WHICH THE NATION HAD NO DENIAL RIGHTS AND THE INSPECTORS HAD COMPLETE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN ANY FACILITY. FOR EACH PROPOSED SYSTEM, ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS WERE POSED CONCERNING SUCH TOPICS AS SAFEGUARD DESIGN, REPORTING OF DIVERTED NUCLEAR MATERIAL, AND LICENSING OF FACILITIES. RESULTS OF THE SURVEY INDICATE THE IMPORTANCE OF TECHNOLOGICAL INTERACTION IN THE OVERALL SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM AND THE IMPORTANCE OF A NATION'S EXPERIENCE IN NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION IN INFLUENCING ITS PERCEPTION OF ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS. THE LENGTH OF TIME A NATION HAS USED NUCLEAR POWER AND ITS CAPACITY FOR GENERATING POWER DIRECTLY CORRESPONDS TO THE WILLINGNESS OF ITS EXPERTS TO ACCEPT STRINGENT EXTERNAL CONTROLS. A SIMILAR RESULT IS SEEN IN THE TECHNICAL ELITE'S PERCEPTION OF THE FINAL SYSTEM TO BE ESTABLISHED UNDER THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. ALTHOUGH MANY OF THE MEMBER NATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY HAVE LITTLE OR NO NUCLEAR POWER CAPACITY, AS THEY DEVELOP SUCH CAPACITY THEY MAY PREFER MORE STRINGENT SAFEGUARDS. TABULAR DATA AND FOOTNOTES ARE PROVIDED. (TWK)