CURRENT SAFEGUARDS CANNOT PREVENT THEFT OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS (ENRICHED URANIUM, PLUTONIUM, AND URANIUM 233) IN QUANTITIES SUFFICIENT FOR MAKING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE PRESENT DEGREE OF PHYSICAL SECURITY IS DEMONSTRABLY LESS THAN THAT USED IN STORING MONEY IN BANKS, YET BANKS ARE CONTINUALLY ROBBED SUCCESSFULLY. IN ADDITION, THE GROWING VOLUME OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS, THE SPREAD OF KNOWLEDGE ON HOW TO MAKE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES, THE NUMEROUS SITUATIONS IN WHICH SUCH MATERIALS CAN THREATEN SOCIETY, AND THE LARGE NUMBER OF VULNERABLE TARGETS ALL MAKE THE PROBLEM AN URGENT ONE. BOTH TERRORIST GROUPS AND NONWEAPONS STATES COULD EASILY STEAL AND USE SUCH MATERIALS. ONLY A COMPLETE SYSTEMS APPROACH TO THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A NATIONAL PHYSICAL SECURITY SYSTEM WILL PROVIDE SUFFICIENT SECURITY WHILE ALLOWING THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY TO GROW. A PATCHWORK APPROACH TO SUCH PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE AREAS AS TRANSPORTATION, FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD BE LESS EFFECTIVE AND MORE COSTLY THAN A SYSTEMS APPROACH. A SYSTEMS APPROACH SHOULD BE BASED ON TWO PRINCIPLES: CONTAINMENT OF MATERIALS TO PREVENT RATHER THAN DETECT THEFT AND SECURITY IN DEPTH THROUGH A SYSTEM OF MULTIPLE PHYSICAL IMPEDIMENTS, ALARMS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND TRANSPORTATION METHODS. SPECIFIC SYSTEM ELEMENTS MIGHT INCLUDE (1) ONSITE ARMED FORCES, (2) PROTECTIVE STRUCTURES, (3) INTRUSION ALARMS, (4) DETECTION SYSTEMS, (5) TAMPERPROOF COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, (6) DEVICES AND HEAVY CONTAINERS TO IMPEDE MATERIALS REMOVAL, AND (7) RESERVE UNITS OF ARMED GUARDS IN A STATE OF READINESS. ALTHOUGH INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS NEED ATTENTION, EACH NATION IS ULTIMATELY RESPONSIBLE FOR PREVENTING THEFT. THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY COULD ESTABLISH PHYSICAL SECURITY STANDARDS TO GUIDE NATIONS IN SETTING UP THEIR OWN SYSTEMS. THE PROBLEM IS SO URGENT THAT IT MUST BE ADDRESSED IMMEDIATELY. AUDIENCE DISCUSSION IS INCLUDED. (CFW)