THE GOVERNMENT CONTENDED THAT UNCONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICES IN PHILADELPHIA COULD NOT BE HALTED BY PRIVATE LITIGANTS AND THAT ONLY THE UNITED STATES COULD MARSHAL RESOURCES AND EVIDENCE NEDED TO END POLICE BRUTALITY. IN AUGUST 1979, THE U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL CHARGED THE PHILADELPHIA POLICE DEPARTMENT WITH WIDESPREAD VIOLATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND ACTS OF BRUTALITY. A DISTRICT COURT JUDGE DISMISSED THE SUIT, RULING THAT THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT LACKED INHERENT STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO ADVANCE THE SUIT. THE COURT NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL WAS AUTHORIZED TO SUE FOR DISCRIMINATION IN FEDERALLY-FUNDED PROGRAMS. THE RELUCTANCE OF COURTS TO ALLOW SUITS BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL IN THE ABSENCE OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY EFFECTIVELY DENIES FEDERAL PROTECTION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS, INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS, AND VICTIMS OF POLICE BRUTALITY. THE BURDEN OF CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT IS PLACED SOLELY UPON STATES AND INDIVIDUALS WHO MAY NOT HAVE THE RESOURCES TO PROTECT CIVIL RIGHTS ADEQUATELY. WITH SUFFICIENT 'INTEREST' IN SAFEGUARDING CIVIL RIGHTS, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL HAS THE AUTHORITY TO SUE IN THE PHILADELPHIA CASE AND OTHERS BY EXERCISING EXECUTIVE POWER TO PROTECT CITIZENS FROM WIDESPREAD DEPRIVATIONS OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. THE YOUNGSTOWN CASE IS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE PHILADELPHIA CASE IN TERMS OF LEGISLATIVE VERSUS EXECUTIVE ACTIONS. SEIZURE OF THE STEEL INDUSTRY IN YOUNGSTOWN WAS AN EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, WHEREAS ACTION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL IN THE PHILADELPHIA CASE DID NOT INVOLVE LEGISLATIVE ACTION BY THE EXECUTIVE. CASE LAW IS CITED. (DEP)