BECAUSE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE GREAT OPPORTUNITY TO ABUSE THEIR POWERS AND, IN TURN, DAMAGE TO THE PUBLIC INTEREST, LAW SHOULD EFFECTIVELY IMPOSE UPON THEM A FIDUCIARY DUTY NOT TO USE THEIR PUBLIC OFFICE FOR PERSONAL GAIN. CURRENT BRITISH LAW DOES NOT DO THIS. RULES FOR DISCLOSURE OF FINANCIAL INTERESTS BY PUBLIC OFFICIALS ARE AMBIGUOUS AS TO THE TYPE OF INTERESTS REQUIRED TO BE DISCLOSED. THE RESULT IS THAT NOT ALL CONFLICT SITUATIONS ARE REVEALED. ADDITIONALLY, THE WEAKNESS OF SANCTIONS, THE 6-MONTH TIME LIMIT ON PROSECUTION, AND THE RETICENCE OF LOCAL OFFICERS TO REPORT MALPRACTICES CONSIDERABLY LESSENS THE RISKS OF DETECTION AND EFFECTIVE PUNISHMENT. ALSO, THERE IS CONFUSION ABOUT THE HANDLING OF A GOVERNMENTAL DECISION IN WHICH A BIASED OFFICIAL HAS PARTICIPATED. THE RECOMMENDATION THAT A COMPLETE LIST OF LOCAL OFFICIAL'S FINANCIAL INTERESTS BE PUBLISHED IS AN IMPROVEMENT ON THE PRESENT LAW, BUT IT DOES NOT GO FAR ENOUGH. WHAT IS NEEDED IS A WIDER EQUITABLE PRINCIPLE TO CURB ALL CONCEIVABLE CONFLICT OF INTEREST SITUATIONS; RESTITUTION SHOULD BE REQUIRED WHEN VIOLATIONS OCCUR. CRIMINAL SANCTIONS WOULD APPLY FOR PARTICULARLY SEVERE ABUSES. (AUTHOR ABSTRACT MODIFIED--RCB)