A CONCEPTUAL SCHEME IS OUTLINED FOR THE DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF CORRUPTION IN ALL SORTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL SETTINGS. THIS IS APPLIED TO BOTH THE TYPICAL BUSINESS AND THE TYPICAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION. CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT DIFFERS FROM THAT IN BUSINESS AS GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION IS THOUGHT TO BE SOMETHING WHICH MUST BE ELIMINATED REGARDLESS OF THE COST INVOLVED. THE GOVERNMENT AGENT IS LESS LIKELY TO BE DEPENDABLE OR CAPABLE, AND HAS LESS TO LOSE FROM DISMISSAL. ALSO, MONITORING AGENTS FROM OUTSIDE THE ORGANIZATION ARE PROBABLY MORE COMMON IN GOVERNMENT, AND CLOSE MONITORING IS PROBABLY MORE DISRUPTIVE OF MANAGEMENT IN GOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS ARE LESS LIKELY TO BE PERMISSIVE ABOUT PETTY CORRUPTION, THEIR EXECUTIVES ARE PROBABLY MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO NONPECUNIARY INDUCEMENTS. OVERALL, INCREASES IN CORRUPTION OVER THE PAST SEVERAL DECADES ARE DUE TO THE PROFITABLITY OF DISHONESTY, THE GROWTH OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED ON BOTH BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT. FOOTNOTES ARE INCLUDED. (JLF)