THE ARTICLE ASSUMES THAT BY 1990 MORE THAN A DOZEN COUNTRIES WILL HAVE ACQUIRED A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY, THAT SOME OF THE NEW STATES MAY BE REGARDED AS DANGEROUS, THAT NO NUCLEAR WAR HAS YET OCCURRED, AND THAT THE WORLD'S ENERGY SITUATION HAS BECOME MORE CRITICAL. THE OBVIOUS CONSEQUENCE OF A TERRORIST ACT WOULD BE THE INCREASED SECURITY AT NUCLEAR FACILITIES. GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE COMPELLED TO REEXAMINE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS OR CONCESSIONS POLICIES, AND MORE ATTENTION WOULD HAVE TO BE GIVEN TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF DECONTAMINATION AND NORMALIZATION. IN ADDITION, GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE LIKELY TO BECOME MORE REPRESSIVE, AND LEGISLATIVE PENALTIES FOR UNAUTHORIZED POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS OR CHANGES IN POLICE PROCEDURES MIGHT RESULT. FURTHER, SUCH AN INCIDENT COULD INSPIRE IMITATION BY OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS AND A POSSIBLE INCREASE IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY, DIRECTED AGAINST PERPETRATORS OR THEIR PERCEIVED ALLIES. DEMANDS FOR GREATER INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE WOULD BE SOUGHT, WITH THOSE NATIONS MOST THREATENED BY TERRORISM TAKING THE LEAD. SUCH CONTROLS, IN TURN, MIGHT GENERATE GREATER NATIONAL SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN NUCLEAR PROGRAMS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A DEMAND FOR A NUCLEAR BLACK MARKET. OTHER CONSEQUENCES MIGHT BE A STRENGTHENED ANTINUCLEAR MOVEMENT, A POSSIBLE DIFFUSED REACTION AGAINST ALL SCIENCE AND HIGH TECHNOLOGY, POSSIBLE PREEMPTIVE MILITARY ACTIONS BY SOME GOVERNMENTS, AND AN ENVIRONMENT LEADING TO ARMS BUILDUPS. NUCLEAR TERRORISM MIGHT ALSO GENERATE ARGUMENTS AGAINST ACQUIRING NUCLEAR ARMS. FINALLY, A NUCLEAR DETONATION MIGHT REFOCUS ATTENTION ON SEVERAL PAST STRATEGIC ISSUES INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ATTEMPT BY TERRORISTS TO PROVOKE A MAJOR WAR, OR THE PROBLEMS OF THE EVACUATION OF CITIES.