Three circuit courts and three superior courts in Connecticut were studied to provide a comparative perspective of plea bargaining processes. An attempt was made to interview all the prosecutors and public defenders working in each court; judges were interviewed if they were assigned to the court under investigation and if the researcher had actually observed them presiding. To determine why newcomers begin plea bargaining most of their cases after gaining experience in the criminal courts, a literature review was conducted, which offers the explanation that experienced personnel employ rewards and sanctions to teach newcomers to share in the benefits of negotiating dispositions. Failure by the newcomers to participate in the plea bargaining system would cause the system to grind to a halt. However, the researcher used quantitative case disposition data and qualitative interview data to dispute the theory of newcomer adaptaion prevalent in the literature. The research demonstrates that plea bargaining is not a function of case pressure and that plea bargaining rates in high and low volume jurisdictions in Connecticut do not differ substantially. Independent of rewards and sanctions employed by the system, newcomers learn that plea bargaining best serves their professional interests. Many of the defendants' cases are simply barren of any contestable factual or legal issues, and defendant, defense attorney, prosecutor, and judge alike feel that a satisfactory resolution of these cases is afforded by the plea bargaining machinery. Plea bargaining will continue to be the central means of case disposition in both high and low volume criminal courts. Footnotes, tables, and over 80 references are included. A legal values questionnaire and interview schedules are appended.