Dworkin's proposition, that in virtually every civil case either the plaintiff or the defendant has a right to a particular decision, is determined to be untenable. Difficulties in the adaptation of Dworkin's theory to practice are reviewed. But the virtues of the rights thesis are also conceded. On an important intuitive level, it is emphasized, there will be some cases for which recourse to rights and principles will yield acceptable decisions. For such cases, the rights thesis provides an answer where none had existed before. Two objections to the rights thesis are raised: (1) not all cases may be decided by recourse to an investigation of the parties' rights, and (2) the rights thesis may not be the best way of ascertaining the rights of the parties involved. Nevertheless, the rights thesis is valuable in that it provides a way to identify and validate uncertainty. For a court faced with a genuinely intractable case there can be no hope that the rights thesis, or any other, will yield a right answer where none exists. But the rights thesis provides standards against which to evaluate the actions of the court. The rights thesis, then, supports judicial discretion. For, in the person of judges, who are often faced with intractable cases and the making of impossible decisions, collective humanity is represented. Judicial abilities are preferred to the mechanistic application of some arbitrary rule. Dworkin's model draws attention to the problem of uncertainty within the law and the fact that law is not exhausted by a list of settled rules. Casenotes are provided.