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Crime Victims Compensation Act - Article 8309-1 - Texas Compensates Victims of Crime

NCJ Number
72192
Journal
Baylor Law Review Volume: 32 Issue: 2 Dated: (Spring 1980) Pages: 247-267
Author(s)
C E Vance
Date Published
1980
Length
21 pages
Annotation
The article describes the Texas Crime Victims Compensation Act and examines constitutional problems which its compensation program and escrow account could encounter.
Abstract
Many provisions of the Texas law were based on the Uniform Crime Victims Reparations Act, but it differs from this act by restricting who may recover, what may be recovered, and in establishing an escrow fund. The compensation act awards compensation to victims placed in financial stress by criminally injurious conduct with monies obtained from fines collected from criminals convicted by the State. In an effort to help victims of highly publicized crimes, the law provides for the establishment of an escrow account consisting of all monies that a convicted or accused person receives for any publication concerning the crime. These funds are used to satisfy any civil judgment obtained by victims of that crime against the criminal. The requirement that a victim be a Texas resident may violate the privileges and immunities clause of the Constitution, as well as the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment. The financial stress provision is not well-detailed and seems to restrict the act's protection to the needy. In addition, administrative costs of determining financial need could negate any savings created by the requirement. A more desirable approach would be to follow the reparations act which awards compensation only to the extent that the loss suffered exceeds 10 percent of the claimant's resources not exempt from execution. Compensation is only awarded for medical expenses and lost earnings, and the exclusion of property loss seems unfair. The act also provides for indemnification of dependents who suffer loss of support as a result of criminally inflicted death, but criteria concerning the amount of damages is unclear. The funding system costs the taxpayers nothing but is probably inadequate to award victims maximum relief. The escrow fund faces three basic constitutional problems: it may deprive the accused of property without due process, it may have ex post facto implications because the act applies to all persons accused or convicted of crimes in Texas, and it may restrict freedom of speech. A better method to give the victim access to the criminal's funds would be to expand the writ of garnishment in criminal cases to apply to unliquidated claims, thereby providing due process and avoiding problems with assets gained from the exercise of free speech. Footnotes and the text of the act are included.