The subjects were inmates of the Shelby County Penal Farm (Tenn.), enrolled in the Self-Management Program from October 1, 1973, to August 31, 1974. Their number varied from 7 to 19. During the first phase, a full-time director and a program consultant (for 2 days a month) were present; in the second phase, the director took a leave of absence (consulting only 1 or 2 days a month); and in the final phase, the director returned full-time and initiated an analysis. During the entire time the inmates used a contingent point-card on which the inmate's earnings, spendings, and response costs were recorded as well as the daily totals of each category and cumulative savings balance. From the first phase to the second phase, the cards evidence a shift in environment from one where there was an emphasis on reinforcing positive behavior to one where punishing misbehavior was emphasized. The original program called for the contingent awarding of points when inmates satisfactorily completed any of the target behaviors. During the director's absence behavioral technicians not only withheld awarding contingent points whenever an inmate failed to reach the criteria on a target behavior, but also levied a response cost, further increasing the environment of punitiveness, and forcing significantly more persons to drop out of the program. These data support the argument that there is a distinct possibility of abuse in operating behavioral systems that do not provide adequate monitoring procedures. The difficulties thus do not appear to be in the empirical methodology of behavioral principles, but rather in their (mis) application. Onsite supervision of all prison rehabilitation programs within an atmosphere of cooperation between treatment personnel and prison administrators is needed. Several tables, three reference notes, and eight references are provided.