For 75 years the juvenile court had the right to act as a parent surrogate for children. Just as few procedural restrictions were placed on parents' powers to control their children, so few were placed on the court's power to intervene in the lives of youth; however, in response to a growing distrust of legal authority and to mounting cynicism over the philosophy of rehabilitation, changes have been introduced in the legal rules governing childhood. Court decisions, standard-setting groups, and new laws have reduced the discretion and autonomy of legal authorities and enhanced the importance of procedural safeguards. Despite the strong sentiments that have produced these changes, they are not without paradox. Under the traditional philosophy of the juvenile court, all children, criminal or otherwise, were to be treated as status offenders. Theoretically, the concern of the court was to treat problems, not deviant acts. Now, however, sharp distinctions have been drawn between criminal and noncriminal children. While the power of the court has been reduced over the latter, the former are to be subjected to procedures which differ only in degree from those to which adults are subjected. While due process for young criminals will be ensured, the 'just deserts' philosophy will tend to dictate the treatment they receive. Rather than rehabilitation, the primary purposes of the juvenile justice system will be to see that justice is done, that children are accountable for their crimes, and that the community is protected. Seventeen references are provided. (Author abstract modified)