Despite existence of a provision which constitutionally mandates jury determination of the law as well as the facts since 1851, no definitive explanation exists of what a jury should do when it 'determines law.' Further, only minimal attention has been directed toward the role counsel can play in the constitutional scheme. Avoidance of these issues by the appellate courts of Indiana only detracts from the effectiveness of trial judges, juries, and counsel. To incorporate the positive implementation it has effected and to reconcile or eliminate the contradictions and inconsistencies which have appeared in the case law, the State supreme court should develop an operation model on the basis of theoretical placement of the jury in the judge's role, with modifications to accommodate the jury's collegial nature. The jury's attention could routinely be directed to legislative intent and be instructed to apply canons of construction. Such commonsense rules of interpretation would provide useful guidelines to the jury which until now has been forced to operate in a vacuum. In addition, the suggested model would provide a useful analogy in impressing jurors with the seriousness of their responsibility. However, some findings of law or fact, are not delegated to the jury under the model. Footnotes are included.