Beginning with a description of the Marxist theories of Althusser and Pashukanis which explain law and penal control in terms of structures and situation conditioned by the economy, this paper analyzes the problems that emerge from the theories' conceptual logic regarding distinctions between the law and the economy. Marxism defines the causes of different social practices in terms of structures, but it does not adequately explain the relationships between their components. An alternative framework for explaining penal control is found in Gurvitch's view of societies as differing forms of social organizations which can be understood in terms of their social relationships. The latter are not interactions between individuals but bonds which supercede them and exist independently of them. These concepts of sociality and social organization are not fixed, but they are perceived as historically and culturally specific. Law and penal control fit into this model since they are essential to social organization. In this context, distinctions between law and economy are unnecessary, as is the need to make all analyses consistent with a universal scheme. According to Gurvitch's theories, both punishment and treatment should be regarded as historically unique and specific social practices. Thus punishment is tied up with competitive capitalism, while treatment as one of the purported aims of the penal system is bound up with the transition from competitive to monopoly capitalism. Consequently, punishment assumes an equality between parties in the relationship, but treatment expressly presupposes inequality. In a society which grants certain rights to individuals, punishment is justified removal or suspension of these rights, but it creates inequality. This contradiction exemplifies social conditions inherent in competitive capitalism. The treatment philosophy does not regard individual rights as inalienable, but it depends on a caring, beneficent state to distribute fruits of freedom. Treatment programs, therefore, are important in the legitimate growing interventionist nature of social organizations and reflect changes in political relationships. A bibliography of 17 references is appended.