The initial contribution argues that antitrust legislation is often used for private purposes at odds with the avowed public intent and explores alternative, less costly antitrust measures. Most of the articles examine and respond to one central article (NCJ-73781) suggesting the application of economic principles and cost minimization to increase the efficiency of antitrust enforcement. The first response (NCJ-73782) argues that such an economic approach has little chance of succeeding since the required enforcement system would be too complicated. Another response (NCJ-73783) addresses the role of victim compensation in an efficiency-oriented antitrust enforcement system. Another contribution (NCJ-73784) addresses the problem of finding an adequate method for measuring the effects of antitrust enforcement. A final argument (NCJ-73785) contends that a combination of high economic punishment and low probability of detection/enforcement constitutes an efficient deterrent against price fixing. All essays include extensive bibiographical footnotes.