The flexible and somewhat ambiguous language of the Hobbs Act is amenable to broad judicial construction. Courts today grant the Federal Government increased jurisdiction over local political, labor, and business-related corruption. The present Hobbs Act began as the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, which Congress initially passed to combat the use of interstate commerce by organized crime, specifically racketeering. A Hobbs Act violation requires the Government to prove two essential elements: first, that the defendant committed an act of robbery or extortion, or attempted or conspired to do so; second, that the unlawful act of the defendant obstructed, delayed, or in some way adversely affected interstate commerce. Federal jurisdiction under Hobbs is a direct result of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce. Although the Government must prove a general intent to affect this commerce, it need not show specific intent. The illegal interference need only be a by-product of the extortionate scheme. Moreover, the scheme need not succeed for Federal courts to find some interference with commerce. Nevertheless, the government must also prove that the victim cooperated out of fear or out of respect for the extortionist's public office. Although the Criminal Code Reform Act of 1979 proscribes application of the Hobbs Act to legitimate labor disputes, the government may prosecute when the labor union's action is a felony intending serious injury or property damage and the Attorney General certifies that a State is unable or unwilling to prosecute such violence. Finally, the propriety of giving the Hobbs Act broad scope is hotly debated, because there is an inherent tension between the need to combat official impropriety and the importance of maintaining traditional State functions. Footnotes are included.