The vague language of the cruel and unusual punishment clause and the limited meaning ascribed to it by the drafters are the primary factors which explain the slow effort of the Supreme Court to fully articulate its meaning. Earlier decisions focused not on the constitutionality of the death penalty itself, but on whether a particular methd of execution involved unnecessary cruelty. Even in the 1972 decision of 'Furman v. Georgia,' the Court was unable to resolve the question of whether the infliction of the death penalty was unconstitutional per se. Nevertheless, the overall effect of the decision was to strike down the capital punishment laws of 39 States and of the Federal Government. In the aftermath of 'Furman,' the legislatures of 39 States enacted new statutes authorizing the death penalty for at least some crimes resulting in the death of another person. The Wyoming legislature responded to 'Furman' by enacting a first-degree murder statute which replaced discretionary jury sentencing in capital cases with a plan requiring the infliction of a mandatory death penalty under certain factual circumstances. However, in 1977, the Supreme Court of Wyoming held that the mandatory death penalty provisions of the Wyoming statutes were unconstitutional in its decision in 'Kennedy v. State.' As a result, shortly after the 'Kennedy' decision, a bill to resurrect the death penalty as an authorized punishment for the crime of first-degree murder was introduced in the Wyoming legislature. Modeled after the Georgia and Florida laws, the new statute was approved. It represents an attempt to employ the guided controlled sentencing discretion mandated by the Supreme Court's 'Gregg' and 'Woodson' holdings. It is suggested that the new statute's objective standards appear acceptable, but that a potential for prejudice exists with regard to their application. Article footnotes total 169.