'Death qualification' affects both the composition of juries in capital cases and the jurors who pass through the process of qualification. Empirical data show that exclusion from capital juries of those opposed to the death penalty is highly prejudicial to the interests of the defendants. Such juries are unrepresentative of the community from which jurors are selected and are peopled by jurors who are prone to accept the statements and evidence offered by the prosecution and to convict. The process of excluding opponents of the death penalty from capital juries also affects those selected for the jury in that information about issues in the case, evidence to be presented, and the probable guilt of the defendant is communicated to the juror during voir dire questioning. Several possible solutions to the inequities produced by death qualification are proposed. Most of the solutions involve limiting the death qualification process to the sentencing state of the trial only or limiting the qualification to one question only. The most effective means of protecting the constitutional rights of criminal defendants, however, would be the abolition of the procedure altogether. Continued use of the process will result in the seating of biased juries in capital cases, a condition that violates the due process rights of criminal defendants. Footnotes are included.