The Supreme Court, with it's recent decision in Paterson and its treatment of insanity cases in Leland and Rivera, has severely curtailed the expansion of due process guarantees of a defendant who asserts an affirmative defense of a crime. The Court has employed an elements approach which ignores the interests deemed vital to due process, as articulated in Mullaney and Winship, and allows technical distinctions to be made on the basis of the express wording used in the statutes. When the interests of society and the defendant are ignored, the burden of proof may be shifted simply by the characterization of mitigating factors as affirmative defenses rather than as elements of the crime. As a result, the fundamental notions of justice and due process, which form the basis of the American judicial system and are designed to protect the accused, are rendered meaningless. As an alternative, the interests approach could give substance to fear of erroneous convictions of the innocent. The Supreme Court should reverse its current trend and reinstate the wide scope of due process conceived in Winship and developed in Mullaney. A total of 177 footnotes are included. (Author abstract modified)