In 1975, Winfield Roberts was implicated in a heroin conspiracy, and the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia solicited his cooperation in the pending investigation, telling him that the nature and extent of his cooperation would be made known to the trying court and would determine the charges brought against him. Roberts refused to cooperate, and at sentencing the prosecutor emphasized Robert's reluctance to cooperate and requested a substantial term of imprisonment. The court imposed an unusually severe sentence, which it attributed in part to Robert's refusal to cooperate with the prosecution. Upon appeal the Supreme Court ruled that punishing noncooperation is a proper exercise of sentencing discretion because the offender's failure to suggest an acceptable excuse for noncooperation invites the trial court to infer improper motives and corresponding moral deficiencies that may prove responsive to punishment. This analysis outlines the difficulties in considering highly ambiguous noncooperation as a determinant of sentencing under any rationale and suggests the importance of a careful inquiry into motive. Countervailing rights, such as the privilege against self-incrimination, are compared with the social benefits sought by punishing noncooperation, and the propriety of the courts' central involvement in determining such punishment is considered. A model analytic framework that could encompass some consideration of noncooperation in appropriate circumstances is proposed, and the model is contrasted with the Roberts decision. The model posits that refusal to cooperate may be punished under utilitarian or retributive rationales only if the motive for noncooperation evinces blameworthiness and if no countervailing right is thereby forfeited. A total of 163 footnotes are listed. (Author abstract modified)