Section 1963 of RICO provides for the forfeiture of certain property rights in criminal enterprises, and the statute orders the Attorney General to dispose of the forfeited interests as soon as possible, 'making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.' Upon conviction of a violation of RICO's Section 1962, the offender automatically forfeits property judged to be derived from the criminal activity. Since this type of criminal forfeiture is based on personal guilt, the rights of the Government in the property derive from an in personam judgment against the offender. With some other exceptions, all other forfeiture provisions under Federal law are generically described as civil forfeitures. Under these cases, which usually arise from violations of customs, revenue, and certain narcotics laws, the property is deemed 'tainted' and the proceeding is against the property itself, independent of any judgment against a person's actions. The RICO criminal forfeiture provisions thus present a significant problem of interpretation, because criminal forfeiture is an unknown quantity in American jurisprudence. In analyzing the implementation of RICO's forfeiture provisions, the paper explores both the historical roots of the forfeiture concept and the conceptual bases for most of American forfeiture law. RICO's Section 1963 and its legislative history are then examined in more detail to identify the statute's intended purposes. The analysis also attempts to define what rights are vested in 'innocent parties' interested in the forfeited property. A total of 148 footnotes are listed. (Author summary modified)