The revocation of parole and allegations of new criminal conduct are closely related. When a new criminal conviction does not exist, the paroling authority must submit evidence on which to base a revocation. The prosecutor can volunteer evidence such the investigating officer's report without problems, but the release of grand jury testimony which returned the indictment raises difficult policy issues because these proceedings are traditionally secret. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit addressed this issue in Bradley v. Fairfax, rejecting the argument that grand jury transcripts could be admitted into parole revocation hearings because they were judicial proceedings. The Seventh Circuit has suggested that any proceeding subject to judicial review would be preliminary to a judicial proceeding and thus could admit grand jury testimony as evidence. This position contrasts with other circuits' decisions denying release of grand jury transcripts to the Federal Trade Commission, the Internal Revenue Service, or State licensing officials. The court in U.S. v. Shillitani ruled that a parole revocation hearing was a judicial proceeding, but denied release of grand jury transcripts because there was no showing of particularized need. The most realistic justification for prohibiting disclosure of grand jury testimony in parole revocation hearings is preventing abuse of the grand jury procedure which is considerably more coercive than any legislative, administrative, or other judicial investigation or trial. Moreover, grand jury testimony is taken without the parolee or counsel being present and thus does not constitute substantial evidence in a parole revocation decision. The article includes 23 footnotes.