Horowitz asserts that since judges are generalists, they are ill-equipped to deal with policy matters involving complex social issues which require specialized, professional expertise. Further, it is argued that adjudication fails to consider all alternatives and their attendant costs, because it tends to focus initially on the rights of the parties and subsequently on a particular remedy favored by one of the participants. Also, the piecemeal nature of adjudication prevents the development of consistent, coherent policies, both within and across courts. Moreover, since courts can act only when they are called upon to do so by litigants, they are at the mercy of their clients and cannot look toward a logical progression in policy development. Another problem which courts have, according to Horowitz, is ascertaining social facts satisfactorily. The final shortcoming of the courts in Horowitz' analysis is their inability to review the effects of their decisions and make adjustments in their policies. While each of Horowitz' arguments points up hindrances in the courts' undertaking action impacting penal policy, these hindrances are not so debilitating as to render courts useless or a negative influence in effecting social change. When measured against an ideal model for decisionmaking that will effect rational social change, the courts may not fit the bill, but when measured against actual alternative efforts at prison reform, the courts have proven to be as effective, and in some cases more effective, than corrections and prison administrators as well as legislatures. A total of 19 references are listed.