This proposal is investigated by taking into account the well-documented role of police as input suppliers to criminals specializing in victimless crimes. The input police supply is simply the right to operate in a given police jurisdiction, and the bribery payment police receive may be formally prearranged with criminals. Because the collection of bribes will reduce the public expenditures on police, the bribe system is similar to a tax system in which revenues are earmarked for a particular expense item. The negative aspect of this viewpoint is that the bribe system is likely to turn police into accomplices in crime. The impact of the bribe system on the level of criminal activity and police corruption will depend on the structure of the market for the illicit output and upon the market for the right to operate or sell such an activity in a police jurisdiction. In this analysis, the demand by criminals for police input is simply the marginal product of the input weighted by the product's price. The monopolized market structure is therefore superior to the competitive because output of the criminal activity is reduced. Given the costs of monitoring police performance in victimless crimes, it seems probable that a bribe system will develop whenever prohibitions against these types of activities exist. Nine footnotes and three figures are provided.