The Court has ruled that an admission of guilt induced by threats and promises is involuntary and may not be used to convict a defendant at trial, but in the case of plea bargaining, it has ruled that an admission of guilt induced by threats and promises is voluntary and may be used to convict a defendant without trial. Further, the Court has ruled that waiver of a right to appeal induced by fear of the death penalty is not a 'knowing and intelligent' waiver, but regarding plea bargaining, the Court has determined that waiver of the right to trial induced by fear of the death penalty is a 'knowing and intelligent' waiver. The Court has also ruled that imposition of a harsher sentence following an appeal violates due process; however, it has ruled as well that the imposition of a harsher sentence following a trial does not violate due process even if it is clear that it is motivated by a desire to discourage lawful trials. Moreover, the Court has determined that a trial conviction based in part on incriminating admissions induced by a prior illegal confession is invalid, but a conviction following a guilty plea induced by a prior illegal confession has been ruled valid. From these contradictory rulings, it appears that the Court has sought to justify a result rather than to apply neutral principles to the determination of the issue before it. The Court's apparent belief that the criminal justice system would be overwhelmed by trials should plea bargaining be abolished (about 90 percent of cases are plea bargained) has not been borne out by experience, but even if it should be, then the administrative system should be changed rather than the rights guaranteed the defendant. A total of 273 footnotes are listed. (Author summary modified)