U.S. flag

An official website of the United States government, Department of Justice.

NCJRS Virtual Library

The Virtual Library houses over 235,000 criminal justice resources, including all known OJP works.
Click here to search the NCJRS Virtual Library

Nuclear Power - Using Psychology To Protect It

NCJ Number
84098
Journal
Security Management Volume: 26 Issue: 7 Dated: (July 1982) Pages: 77-81
Author(s)
J S Baird; G J Hammond
Date Published
1982
Length
5 pages
Annotation
Proper psychological tests and testing procedures are important for screening applicants for employment in nuclear power plants as well as determining which employees should be granted unescorted access to the facilities.
Abstract
Whether a test or procedure is reliable depends on the extent to which a test or measurement technique is consistent or repeatable. Validity is the extent to which a technique measures what it is intended to measure. To increase reliability and validity, psychologists rely on a battery of techniques. In all cases, using two methods of testing is better than relying on one. Most professionals combine a standardized test and a face-to-face interview. The examiner may also use behavioral observations, work samples, projective tests, questionnaires, or other techniques. Currently, the most popular objective measure of abnormal personality traits used by professionals in the nuclear industry is the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. Many preemployment psychological procedures include a projective test of personality, which usually involves the analysis of open-ended responses to ambiguous stimuli like ink blots, pictures, sentences, or words. The most commonly used methods are the Rorschach, the Thematic Apperception Test, and the Incomplete Sentences Test. These tests are designed to identify motivations and needs not readily apparent from outward behavior or verbal reports. Test results, clinical impressions, and recommendations gathered in the various tests culminate in a psychological report. Care should be exercised to consider only the results pertinent to the objectives of the nuclear security program.