Outmoded conceptions of the NGRI, exemplified by legal doctrines such as the presumption of continuing insanity, are gradually being discarded and replaced by new, more objective judicial and legislative attitudes. The recent trends toward liberalization of laws governing commitment and releases of those acquitted by reason of insanity are well supported by relevant precedent and thoughtful commentary. A growing number of courts, drawing upon recent Supreme Court cases that address the rights of mentally ill persons generally, have held that substantially equivalent treatment of NGRI's and civilly committed persons is required by the equal protection and due process clauses. Marked disparities in the statutory treatment of civilly and criminally committed persons in Georgia engendered constitutional challenges in the State courts. In 1980, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District in Benham v. Edwards found that the State law was unconstitutional and ruled that all Georgia NGRI's be given hearings to determine their present mental condition. The court correctly distinguished the issue of the defendant's mental state at the time of the crime and the question of mental illness at the acquittal state. It rejected the availability of alternative release procedures and presumption of continued insanity justifications. The article contains 227 footnotes. (Author summary modified)