Because no one has focused on the development of a systematic approach to the insanity defense in the Federal system, the relevant procedures and rules of law are a patchwork of inconsistencies that culminated in the John Hinckley verdict. Hinckley was accused of violating both Federal and District of Columbia statutes when he attempted to assassinate the President of the United States. He was tried under Federal rules yet was committed under the District of Columbia Code. The formal verdicts available to the Federal jury in the District of Columbia are guilty, not guilty, or not guilty by reason of insanity. By choosing the last, the jury first had to find that the prosecution proved all elements of each offense, including intent. Next, the jury had to decide whether a reasonable doubt had been raised about Hinckley's sanity. He was excused from criminal culpability, because he raised that reasonable doubt. The prosecution's insurmountable burden was to prove his sanity beyond a reasonable doubt, but the jury instructions defined only insanity, not sanity. The jury's verdict was an acquittal, and Hinckley was committed in accordance with the insanity acquittees provisions of the D.C. Code. Now in order to keep Hinckley committed to a mental hospital, the Government must contend every 6 months that Hinckley has a mental disease making him dangerous to himself and society, an argument contrary to the Government's trial position. The entire system of the insanity defense should be examined, including the definition, the burden, the verdict, the scope of expert testimony, and commitment procedures.