The first issue is considered in the context of the case of United States v. Santa Rita Store Co., and the second issue is examined in the case of United States v. General Motors Corp. From a policy standpoint, whether a corporate defendant should be considered a conspirator depends largely on how the goals of conspiracy law would be served by further anthropomorphizing the corporation in the context of the facts, and conventional respondent superior principles seem sufficiently flexible to permit achievement of those goals in a variety of factual settings. In a case such as Santa Rita Store, for example, it is possible to construct both a workable analytical framework and a policy justification for recognizing that corporations are capable of conspiring through a single agent under general conspiracy law. Doctrinal and policy considerations may also support recognition of corporate liability for conspiracy despite acquittals of all agents through whom the corporation is accused of conspiring, as was suggested by the 'General Motors' court. A total of 80 footnotes are provided.