This analysis concentrates on the effects of sentencing innovations on defendants and judges' and lawyers' behaviors. The first evaluations examined are abolition of plea bargaining in Alaska, Michigan's Hampton County's policy of forbidding bargaining plea reductions in drug sale cases, and the Wayne County (Detroit), Mich. prosecutor's ban on dismissing firearms charges pursuant to plea bargaining. These studies showed that plea bargaining can be controlled when the chief prosecutor wishes to do so and that such controls increase numbers of defendants diverted from the system at screening and dismissal. Moreover, the assistant prosecutors prefer working in a system with little or reduced plea bargaining whereas defense lawyers dislike it. The paper discusses mandatory sentencing laws in Michigan, Massachusetts, and New York, noting that insufficient data collected on case processing and dispositions precluded any firm conclusions. The analysis of California's determinate sentencing law found no compelling evidence of substantial changes in sentence outcome attributable to the law, although it affected case processing by expanding sentence bargaining to include explicit reference to length of prison terms. The paper concluded that voluntary/descriptive sentencing guidelines had no discernible impact on sentencing whereas prescriptive and presumptive guidelines implemented in Minnesota did alter sentencing practices. Evaluations of parole guideline systems in Washington, Oregon, and Minnesota found formal compliance with procedural requirements but also uncovered evidence of increased screening or other early dispositions of cases to avoid applying the procedural rules. All studies revealed needs for extended observation periods, outcome measures at all case processing levels, and adequate controls for changes in case attributes. Tables, 38 footnotes, and over 50 references are provided.