In plea bargaining, the defendants' bargaining positions are generally weak, and the only benefit they can render the criminal justice system by pleading guilty is saving the prosecuting time, the expense of a trial, and foreclosing any risk of acquittal. The primary inducements for defendants to plead guilty are charge reductions or dismissals and favorable sentence recommendations. The primary concern with plea bargaining has been the lack of consistency in plea negotiation agreements between prosecutors within the same jurisdiction, between jurisdictions, within the same State, and between States, such that a defendant's disposition depends more on the particular prosecutor who has his/her case and the jurisdiction in which the crime occurred than upon the nature of the crime. The majority of the plea bargaining process lies within the realm of prosecutorial discretion, and prosecutors have been reluctant to disclose how or why they make specific bargaining decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the plea bargaining procedure is replete with potential abuses and has attempted to protect the defendant's constitutional rights, but the abolition of plea bargaining is recognized to be an essential part of case processing under the current court structure and resources. Still, plea bargaining should be standarized and include procedural guarantees and avenues of appeal for defendants which ensure the protection of rights promised to the accused. Further, plea bargaining must become more open and accountable to the public. Sixty-five notes are provided.