In Rhodes v. Chapman, the Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of whether overcrowded prison facilities may constitute cruel and unusual punishment, concluding that 'double-celling' alone does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Still, several cases since 'Rhodes' have demonstrated that the Federal courts will not defer to legislators and prison officials if the conditions of overcrowded confinement amount to cruel and unusual punishment. Judicial decisions pertaining to the right of pretrial detainees not to be punished indicate that when all the conditions of confinement constitute punishment, as defined in 'Bell,' then the practices or conditions are forbidden by due process considerations. Regarding inmates' right to privacy, Sterling v. Cupp (Oregon) exemplifies an alternative means for prisoners to assert privacy or personal dignity claims; they should look to the protections in State constitutions in addition to those in the Federal Constitution. In court decisions bearing upon due process protected liberty interests, the halfway house as well as parole and probation constitute forms of conditional liberty which may give rise to an 'implicit promise' or 'justifiable expectation' of continued liberty which cannot be taken away without a hearing conforming to due process procedures. Judicial decisions related to the transfer of State inmates to Federal custody have authorized such transfers when States do not offer the type of treatment available in Federal facilities which a particular inmate requires. A total of 221 footnotes are provided.