U.S. flag

An official website of the United States government, Department of Justice.

NCJRS Virtual Library

The Virtual Library houses over 235,000 criminal justice resources, including all known OJP works.
Click here to search the NCJRS Virtual Library

Strikes and Strike Penalties in the Public Sector

NCJ Number
93776
Author(s)
C A Olson; J L Stern; J M Najita; J M Weisberger
Date Published
1981
Length
513 pages
Annotation
Strikes by public employees are analyzed in this study. The report includes an overview of the issues raised by public employee strikes, the design of the study, a historical analysis of trends in the number of public employee strikes, the theoretical impact of strike penalties on strikes and bargaining outcomes, and a legal analysis of strike penalties.
Abstract
An analysis of the strike experience and policies in Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Wisconsin and the results of a statistical analysis of strikes by teachers, firefighters, police, and nonuniformed municipal employees in a sample of governments from six of the seven States are also covered. Although numerous qualifications apply to each finding, the major conclusions from the study are (1) strike penalties that are consistently enforced can decrease the number of public employee strikes; (2) interest arbitration can also significantly reduce the number of strikes; (3) union recognition disputes resolved through State mandated election procedures appear to reduce union recognition strikes; (4) State educational policy that determines how school aid and lost school days are to be handled when teachers strike has at least as great an impact on teacher strikes as strike penalties included in collective bargaining legislation; (5) no long lasting, detrimental effects of public employee strikes were detected in the analysis of legal strikes in Hawaii and Pennsylvania; (6) although no empirical evidence was presented, the theoretical analysis of strike penalties suggests that they lower bargaining outcomes below what they would be in the absence of penalties.(NTIS abstract)